On October 4, 2024, I received the final report of the East Idaho Critical Incident Task Force in the officer involved shooting which occurred on September 1, 2024, in the 1200 block of Woodruff Avenue in Idaho Falls, Bonneville County, Idaho. I have reviewed the videos, the scene, and the interviews conducted in the investigation for the purpose of determining whether any criminal laws were violated by Deputy Sheriff Zachery Skidmore who is employed by the Bonneville County Sheriff’s Office. The autopsy report is not completed, but a toxicology report completed as part of the autopsy has been provided.

In fulfilling this duty of criminal review, it is not the Prosecutor’s role to seek ways to justify law enforcement actions. I am not their advocate in these circumstances. The analysis begins with an objective and open mind. As the facts of this case were developed, however, and the applicable law researched, it became apparent that the overwhelming weight of the law leads to the conclusion that Deputy Skidmore bears no criminal liability for his actions. For the reasons described below, I find no evidence to support that Deputy Skidmore committed a criminal offense in relation to the incident described below.  

STANDARD OF CRIMINAL REVIEW

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-109, “a crime or public offense is an act committed or omitted in violation of a law forbidding or commanding it, and to which is annexed, [an enumerated] punishment.” Pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 19-505 and 19-506, in order to charge a crime, there must be sufficient facts which tend to establish there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it. In other words, there must be both a prohibited act and sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to believe that an individual violated a law, which requires or proscribes an act, and provides for a punishment for committing or omitting the act.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. At 03:28:18 on September 1, 2024, Deputy McMurtrey of the Bonneville County Sheriff’s Office initiated a traffic stop on a 2016 blue Subaru WRX, registered to Joshua Ramirez of Idaho Falls.  

2. Deputy McMurtrey observed the vehicle traveling northbound on Woodruff Blvd. at its intersection with 12th street.  

3. The vehicle crossed the middle line almost sideswiping Deputy McMurtrey as the deputy pulled into the center turn lane.

4. Deputy McMurtrey turned his vehicle around and initiated his overhead lights to stop the vehicle.  

5. As Deputy McMurtrey turned around, the Subaru had crossed into the oncoming lanes of traffic.  

6. The Subaru refused to stop and continued northbound on Woodruff.

7. Deputy McMurtrey continued northbound trying to stop the Subaru by further activating his siren.  

8. The Subaru continued for several blocks northbound on N. Woodruff and continued to fail to maintain its lane and going into oncoming lanes of traffic.  

9. Deputy McMurtrey told dispatch the vehicle was traveling 35-40 mph.

10. 03:29:39: Deputy Skidmore and Deputy Judy arrived in the area to assist Deputy McMurtrey.  

11. Deputy McMurtrey was given approval to use a “PIT” (pursuit intervention technique) maneuver to stop the Subaru.

12. When all units were in position, Deputy McMurtrey went to the left side of the blue Subaru and conducted a PIT maneuver near the 1400 Block of N. Woodruff Blvd.    

13. 03:30:29: the PIT maneuver was successful and the other units surrounded the Subaru.  

14. The blue Subaru came to a stop at approximately 1235 N. Woodruff Ave. next to Timberline Auto.

15. The three deputies maneuvered their vehicles around the Subaru to prevent its escape.

16. Because the PIT maneuver requires that the officer follow through, Deputy McMurtrey proceeded past the suspect vehicle and then turned around.

17. Deputy Skidmore, who was immediately behind Deputy McMurtrey’s vehicle pulled in front of the Subaru to block it from moving forward, he was the first deputy to exit his vehicle.

18. Deputy Judy who had been behind Deputy Skidmore, positioned his vehicle next to the Subaru’s driver door to prevent the driver from exiting. The positions of the vehicles were as approximately shown below:

19. 03:30:30: As Deputy Skidmore was the first to exit his vehicle, he began giving Mr. Ramirez commands to show his hands, warning “do not move or you will get shot.”

20. Deputy Skidmore gave Mr. Ramirez numerous commands at gunpoint.

21. In the video captured by Deputy Judy’s dash cam, Mr. Ramirez can be seen looking directly at Deputy Skidmore after he has drawn his weapon and is pointing it at him.

22. Almost immediately, Mr. Ramirez reaches out his arms in a “shooter’s stance” and points directly at Deputy Skidmore, although none of the deputies report seeing this gesture.

23. Deputy Judy also instructed Mr. Ramirez at gunpoint to show his hands.  

24. Mr. Ramirez did not comply with the deputies’ commands and continued to move erratically inside the vehicle.  

25. Deputy Judy’s dash cam captured Mr. Ramirez’s erratic behavior and movements including one gesture where he pointed his hands  in a “shooter’s grip” as if holding a gun at Deputy Judy.

26. However, none of the deputies reported seeing this gesture.

27. Deputy Judy stated he heard Ramirez say, “DO IT!” multiple times to the deputies.

28. On the body worn camera video, sounds are heard indicating that Mr. Ramirez was turning the ignition key on multiple times.

29. It is unclear whether the vehicle was stalled or was already running, however, Mr. Ramirez was unable to make the vehicle move.

30. 03:30:32: Deputy Skidmore tried to open the passenger door, but it was locked.  

31. 03:30:37: Mr. Ramirez rolled down the passenger door window.  

32. Deputy Skidmore was still giving commands “get your hands up” and “show me your hands”  

33. Mr. Ramirez continued to move erratically inside his vehicle.  

34. Deputy McMurtrey approached the passenger door.

35. 03:30:39: Mr. Ramirez lunged and reached behind the passenger seat with both hands in the direction of Deputy McMurtrey.

36. At the same time, Deputy McMurtrey stepped back and away from the vehicle.

37. 03:30:39: Deputy Skidmore fired 9 shots into the blue Subaru striking Mr. Ramirez multiple times.  

38. Deputy McMurtrey and Deputy Judy did not fire their weapons.

39. 03:31:41: Deputy McMurtrey opened the passenger door and removed Mr. Ramirez from the vehicle.

40. 03:32:15: Mr. Ramirez was unresponsive.

41. Deputy McMurtrey, Deputy Judy and Sgt. Goms with Idaho Falls Police Department attempted life saving measures on Mr. Ramirez for several minutes until Idaho Falls paramedics arrived.

42. 03:37:50: the deputies state they don’t have a pulse and CPR was initiated.

43. 03:40:19: Idaho Falls Ambulance arrived on scene and took over medical treatment.  

44. Idaho Falls Paramedics find that Mr. Ramirez is in a state of pulseless electrical activity or “PEA,” meaning Mr. Ramirez’s heart has stopped.

45. Paramedics attempted medically indicated life saving measures on Mr. Ramirez for several minutes.

46. 03:46:36 Mr. Ramirez was placed in the ambulance and transported to EIRMC.

47. Paramedics observed what appeared to be at least four gunshot wounds to Mr. Ramirez’s chest.

48. 3:57:10: Idaho Falls Ambulance arrived at the hospital with Joshua Ramirez.  

49. Hospital staff attempted further life-saving measures, but pronounce Mr. Ramirez dead at 4:10 a.m.

50. The attending staff noted what appeared to be eight wounds to Mr. Ramirez, but it is unclear whether this would potentially include both entry and exit wounds.

51. On 09/26/2024, Coroner Rick Taylor received a toxicology report from the Ada County Coroner’s office from the autopsy performed on Mr. Ramirez which indicated his BAC (Blood Alcohol Concentration) was .157, or twice the legal limit, at the time of the autopsy.

52. It is difficult to determine how much alcohol had potentially been eliminated before blood was drawn during the autopsy for the toxicology testing.

53. During the search of the scene, investigators find nine casings, which is consistent with the ammunition count which indicated Deputy Skidmore had fired nine rounds from his service firearm.

54. During a search of Mr. Ramirez’s vehicle, a small folding knife, with the blade in the open position, was found on the floor of the vehicle just in front of and to the left side of the driver’s seat:

55. However, none of the deputies reported seeing the knife in Mr. Ramirez’s hand, or at all prior to the shooting.

56. It cannot be forensically determined when the knife was opened or whether Mr. Ramirez handled the knife during the incident.

STATEMENT OF THE LAW

An otherwise violent act is justifiable if a person was acting in self-defense and/or the defense of another.  If an act involving asserted self-defense results in death, the analysis proceeds under Idaho Code § 18-4009, which states in pertinent part, “Homicide is justifiable when committed by any person when resisting any attempt to murder any person, or to commit a felony, or to do some great bodily injury upon any person.”  Essentially this permits self-defense with a deadly weapon only where there is reasonable cause to believe, and the actor does believe, he (or a third person) is in danger of great bodily injury or death.

Homicide is justifiable when committed by public officers when reasonably necessary in overcoming actual resistance in the discharge of any legal duty including preserving the peace.  Use of deadly force is justified in overcoming actual resistance when the officer has probable cause to believe that the resistance poses a threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.  

In order to find that a person acted in self-defense, all of the following conditions must be found to have been in existence at the time of the use of deadly force:

1. A person must have believed that they or others were in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm.

2. In addition to that belief, a person must have believed that the action they took was necessary to save themselves or others from the danger presented.

3. The circumstances must have been such that a reasonable person, under similar circumstances, would have believed that they were in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury and believed that the action taken was necessary.

4. A person must have acted only in response to that danger and not for some other motivation.

5. When there is no longer any reasonable appearance of danger, the right of self-defense ends.

In deciding upon the reasonableness of a person’s beliefs, it should be determined what an ordinary and reasonable person might have concluded from all the facts and circumstances which existed at that time, and not with the benefit of hindsight.  

The danger must have been present and imminent or must have so appeared to a reasonable person under the circumstances.  A bare fear of death or great bodily injury is not sufficient to justify a homicide or use of deadly force.  The person must have acted under the influence of fears that only a reasonable person would have had in a similar position.

Under the law of self-defense, a person has the right to defend himself from “the infliction of great bodily injury,” but “the exercise of that right must be grounded upon a reasonable apprehension of imminent harm, and a reasonable belief that the killing is necessary to protect against such injury.”

The kind and degree of force which a person may lawfully use in self-defense is limited by what a reasonable person in the same situation, seeing what that person sees and knowing what that person knows, would believe to be necessary at that time. Any use of force beyond what is necessary is regarded by the law as excessive. Although a person may believe that they are acting, and may act, in self-defense, a person is not justified in using a degree of force clearly in excess of that apparently and reasonably necessary under the existing facts and circumstances.

Bare fear alone is not a legally sufficient reason to act in self-defense. In addition to one’s perception of the situation, there must be circumstances sufficient to excite the fears of “a reasonable man.”  The Idaho rule of self-defense is not premised upon a subjective test. It is grounded in the objective concept of the actions of a “reasonable person.”  

THREAT PERCEPTION AND MISTAKEN BELIEF

The defense of self or of another does not require a person to wait until he or she ascertains whether the danger is apparent or real. A person confronted with such danger has a clear right to act upon appearances such as would influence the action of a reasonable person.  In justifying the use of force, “reasonableness” is generally to be gauged from “a totality of the circumstances” then confronting the officer.  

Threat Perception

Garner imposes conditions that limits an officer’s authority to use gunfire to affect a seizure. But if kept within those limits, the use of deadly force will be deemed reasonable. Suspect conduct which threatens the officer at a level of serious physical harm or death falls within these limits. It requires asking whether the officer could reasonably have had “probable cause to believe that the suspect pose[d] a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others.”  A serious and imminent threat to the officer’s safety will permit him to respond with gunfire.  Whether the officer reasonably perceived a threat must be assessed objectively. The focus is specifically on the moment he used his weapon and in the moments directly preceding it.  Courts have consistently applied Garner’s analysis to disputed police shootings.

In deadly-force cases involving both armed and unarmed suspects, courts have accepted the “action-reaction principle” which has justified the officer’s “anticipatory” or “preemptory” use of his weapon to protect himself. In other words, a nascent threat can be sufficient; it need not materialize to the point of harm.  The “action-reaction principle” is defined as the commonly accepted understanding that a person acting has the advantage over a person reacting, due to the delay caused by the brain’s physiological reaction time.

As the court observed in Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640 (4th Cir.1996):

The critical point [is] precisely that [the suspect] was “threatening”—threatening the lives of [the officers]. The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to wait until a suspect shoots to confirm that a serious threat of harm exists. Officers need not be absolutely sure [of] the suspect’s intent to cause them harm—the Constitution does not require that certitude precede the act of self-protection.  

It is the perceived threat of attack by a suspect, apart from the actual attack, to which the officer may respond preemptively. If his perceptions were objectively reasonable, he incurs no liability even if no weapon was seen, or the suspect was later found to be unarmed, or if what the officer mistook for a weapon was something innocuous.  

In evaluating reasonableness in threat-perception cases, courts have also accepted that officers are trained to recognize certain behaviors and “body language” as danger cues. These include obvious attempts to evade the officer, furtive gestures and glances, sudden turns, and the ignoring of commands, such as an order to show one’s hands. Because such encounters often occur at night, this limits vision significantly and enhances risk to both the officer and the suspect.

That officers commonly infer threats from the way a suspect moves, based on their immediate perceptions and street experience, has been highlighted as well by state courts:

It is quite apparent to an experienced police officer, and indeed it may almost be considered common knowledge, that a handgun is often carried in the waistband. It is equally apparent that law-abiding persons do not normally step back while reaching to the rear of the waistband, with both hands, to where such a weapon might be carried. Although such action may be consistent with innocuous or innocent behavior, it would be unrealistic to require [the officer] to assume the risk that the [suspect’s] conduct was in fact innocuous or innocent. It would, indeed, be absurd to suggest that a police officer has to await the glint of steel before he can act to preserve his safety.  

Nothing in Garner contradicts the cases in which unarmed suspects have been shot but the officer’s threat-perception was found objectively reasonable. Garner held that it was constitutionally unreasonable to shoot an unarmed felony suspect where (1) the officer could see that the suspect’s hands held no weapon, (2) he was “reasonably sure” the suspect was unarmed, and (3) the suspect was fleeing over a fence, not reaching for an unknown object or repeatedly defying an order to raise his hands in close proximity to the officer.  On those facts the Garner suspect posed “no immediate threat to the officer.”  In the cited reasonable threat-perception cases, all the signs were to the contrary. That the suspect was found to be unarmed afterward was irrelevant.

In Graham, the Supreme Court identified several contextual considerations, some drawn from Garner, for evaluating whether a particular use of deadly or non-deadly force was objectively reasonable under the applicable standard. These include “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect pose[d] an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”  The so-called Graham factors, however, are not some judicially-imposed checklist the officer must run down before employing force. Rather, they are simply examples to assist the trier of fact in assessing the reasonableness of force under particular circumstances. They present a “non-exhaustive list” in the calculus of what is reasonable.  

Other relevant considerations may, and often do, exist. These include whether the incident occurred at night, “the suspect’s demeanor,” the “size and stature of the parties involved,” and whether the suspect was “intoxicated and noncompliant.”   Also relevant is whether the suspect is, or appears to be, violent or dangerous, the duration of the confrontation, whether it occurs during a chase or an arrest, the possibility that the suspect may be armed, and the number of suspects with whom the officer must contend.  

Reasonable but Mistaken Belief

The objectively reasonable officer can be mistaken. What is a “reasonable” belief in light of the officer’s perceptions could also be a mistaken belief, and the fact that it turned out to be mistaken does not detract from its reasonableness when considered within the factual context and compressed timeframe of his decision to act.

In Anderson v. Russell, supra, the officer shot an unarmed suspect who, ignoring the officer’s orders, “was lowering his hands in the direction of a bulge” near “[his] waistband.”  The bulge was afterward discovered to be a Walkman radio. The Fourth Circuit found “[Officer] Russell’s split-second decision to use deadly force reasonable in light of Russell’s well-founded, though mistaken, belief that [the suspect] was reaching for a handgun.”

In Saucier, where an officer’s entitlement to qualified immunity turned on the reasonableness of his perceptions at the moment he used force, the United States Supreme Court specifically extended the mistaken-belief defense to police use-of-force cases:

Noting that officers “can have reasonable, but mistaken, beliefs as to the facts establishing the existence of probable cause or exigent circumstances, for example,” and still be deemed immune for such mistakes, the Saucier court applied “[t]he same analysis [to] excessive force cases, where in addition to the deference officers receive on the underlying constitutional claim, qualified immunity can apply in the event the mistaken belief was reasonable.”  

Saucier’s two-step procedure for addressing an officer’s assertion of qualified immunity was recently modified in Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009), but that case left undisturbed the availability of Saucier’s defense for police-defendants. If the officer’s mistake is reasonable, immunity attaches “regardless of whether the [officer’s] error is ‘a mistake of fact, a mistake of law, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.’ ”  

Constraints on Evaluating Reasonableness

Because “police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments [about the amount of force necessary],” the reasonableness of the officer’s belief as to the appropriate level of force should be judged from that on-scene perspective.

Graham explicitly cautions deference to the law enforcement perspective:

“The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving-about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has described Graham’s deference this way:

[W]e must avoid substituting our personal notions of proper police procedure for the instantaneous decision of the officer at the scene. We must never allow the theoretical, sanitized world of our imagination to replace the dangerous and complex world that policemen face every day. What constitutes “reasonable” action may seem quite different to someone facing a possible assailant than to someone analyzing the question at leisure.  

In evaluating reasonableness, some leeway must be given the officer for on-scene judgments made during the uncertainty of a confrontational encounter. Unlike judges and juries, “officers on the beat are not often afforded the luxury of armchair reflection.”  

In assessing the officer’s decision to use force, including deadly force, fact-finders are strictly forbidden from using “the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”  Instead, Graham mandates a tightly constrained frame of reference within which to calculate reasonableness. The required perspective is that of the “reasonable officer on the scene,” standing in the defendant-officer’s shoes, perceiving what he then perceived and acting within the limits of his knowledge or information as it then existed.  When the prosecutor reviews the officer’s action against the standard applicable to the force used, he must do so from that viewpoint. This constraint is unique to police-defendant cases, in contrast to the normal freedom to envision the dynamics of a confrontation through the eyes of other parties or witnesses.  

Facts learned or discovered later, and actions taken afterward, are irrelevant in this review, even if they would be relevant for some other purpose.  Graham warns specifically against the prohibited territory of second-guessing and “armchair reflection.” This includes comparative speculation, couched in backward-looking terms, about what the officer “could have” or “might have” done differently, and whether he “should have” employed alternate or lesser means of force, or different tactics.  This is because the relevant legal consideration is not what this defendant-officer “should have” known or done, but rather what the reasonable officer, placed in his shoes, “ could have believed “ about the situational need for deadly force in reacting to an imminent threat.  

A person placed under an apparently threatening and menacing danger is only expected to act as a reasonably prudent person would act under similar circumstances and surroundings. “Under such circumstances they ordinarily have but a moment for deliberation and decision. It might so happen that as a matter of fact they could have done any one of a number of other things, and thereby have avoided the danger and refrained from committing the homicide. After they have acted, they cannot be judged from the theoretical standpoint of the man who is resting in both apparent and real safety, confronted by no danger, and menaced by no threats or demonstrations of sudden violence and felonious import. He must act quickly. He must act as a reasonable and prudent man would be likely to act under similar conditions and circumstances, and this is all the law, reason, or justice demands.”  

The burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the asserted act of self-defense was not justifiable.  If there is a reasonable doubt whether the asserted act of self-defense was justifiable, a person cannot be found guilty under the law.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

This case is analyzed to determine whether Deputy Skidmore’s actions were justified or conversely, if without justification, meet the elements of the crimes of aggravated battery, manslaughter or murder.

Murder is the killing of a human being without legal justification or excuse and with malice aforethought.  

Manslaughter is defined as unlawfully killing another person without malice. Voluntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of another person when in the heat of the moment; unlike murder, there was no plan to carry out the crime, it simply happened while provoked. Involuntary manslaughter is the killing of a person when carrying out another unlawful act or while recklessly or negligently operating a deadly weapon.

A primary element of these offenses is that the use of force was without legal justification. The killing of a human being is legally justified when done in self-defense.  In this case, as an element of the criminal prosecution, the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Deputy Skidmore was not justified under principles of self-defense in shooting Mr. Ramirez.

Justifiable Homicide Factors

This case is being reviewed as a use of force that resulted in death and thus a homicide. The standard in this case, is whether Deputy Skidmore was confronted with the present and imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury, or was otherwise justified by Idaho statutes in using the force which resulted in the death.

The officer’s action was within the discharge of the officer’s legal duty as a peace officer. Deputy Skidmore was on duty and was responding to a call for assistance by a fellow officer in pursuit of an apparent impaired driver. In this case, it was reasonable and within the scope of his duties to respond to this call for assistance.

The officer was in a place where he had a right to be. Deputy Skidmore was on a public roadway responding to a call for assistance after a fellow officer was attempting a lawful traffic stop on a public roadway. This roadway is open to the public. There is no basis to believe that Mr. Ramirez had any right to exclude the officer from the public roadway where Deputy Skidmore was lawfully standing.

The officer was resisting a public offense. Deputy Skidmore was in uniform and identifiable as a police officer and gave Mr. Ramirez a lawful order “show me your hands.” Mr. Ramirez ignored these instructions and made erratic movements inside his vehicle. Mr. Ramirez attempted to start the vehicle in an apparent attempt to flee. Mr. Ramirez was resisting and obstructing the deputies in the lawful discharge of their duties during a lawful attempt to take Mr. Ramirez safely into custody. Mr. Ramirez’s movements were reasonably viewed as threatening.

The officer did not provoke the threatening behavior. Deputy Skidmore was responding to the report of impaired driver, was identifiable as a deputy sheriff, and gave Mr. Ramirez common law enforcement commands. I find no evidence that Deputy Skidmore made threatening or provocative statements (“fighting words”) and find Deputy Skidmore made no unjustifiably threatening gestures. Upon review of the video from the officers’ videos, I conclude all statements and acts by Deputy Skidmore were consistent with common law enforcement training for dealing with a non-compliant suspect under these circumstances. I found nothing that Deputy Skidmore said or did that would have reasonably provoked a rational person to react in the irrational manner Mr. Ramirez exhibited.

Garner Factors

The severity of the crime at issue. While driving under the influence of alcohol and fleeing/eluding under these circumstances probably did not rise to a felony level, both can present clear risks to the safety of the public.

Whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others. The immediate arrest of Mr. Ramirez was necessary because of the risk he posed to other drivers on the road due to his impaired driving, including narrow misses and driving in the oncoming lane of travel. Mr. Ramirez’s action to restart the vehicle after the PIT maneuver were threatening to the deputies who were standing near the vehicle to effect the arrest of Mr. Ramirez.

Whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. The available videos show efforts by Mr. Ramirez to start the vehicle. His movements did not comply with the commands given by the deputies. Although the deputies did not specifically recognize the gestures by Mr. Ramirez simulating a shooter’s grip or shooter’s stance, they are indicative of the nature of the movements.

Objectively Reasonable Fear

The officer reacted to a reasonable appearance of danger. Mr. Ramirez suddenly lunged behind the passenger seat into the back seat, in the direction of Deputy McMurtrey.  It is difficult to dispute that this would appear to be a threatening action, as there is no reasonable alternative explanation for this action. Deputy Skidmore’s perception that Mr. Ramirez’s action constituted an immediate threat to Deputy Skidmore or other officers was objectively reasonable.

Mr. Ramirez’s actions created a perception of a present and imminent danger of death or great bodily harm to the officer. There was no way for Deputy Skidmore to know what Mr. Ramirez intended with his sudden, lurch into the back seat. It was reasonable to perceive that Mr. Ramirez presented a risk to the officers.

Objectively Reasonable Force

Deputy Skidmore was justified in using deadly force because the officer had probable cause to believe that Mr. Ramirez’ actions posed a threat of death or serious physical injury to himself and other officers. Deputy Skidmore was initially within a short distance of Mr. Ramirez when he saw the sudden movement toward Deputy McMurtrey. Deputy Skidmore had reasonable cause to believe that Mr. Ramirez’s actions in this case posed a threat of death or serious physical injury to himself or other officers. As a matter of law, Deputy Skidmore had a right to fire his weapon at Mr. Ramirez when it appeared to Deputy Skidmore that Mr. Ramirez was a further threat to Deputy Skidmore and other officers in the area.

The officer’s action was necessary to save himself from the apparent danger presented. Deputy Skidmore had to act quickly to stop the threat. It was a reasonable perception by Deputy Skidmore that Mr. Ramirez presented an immediate threat to Deputy Skidmore and other deputies. While the exact nature of the threat was not immediately identifiable, I find the contextual considerations, some drawn from Garner, for evaluating whether a particular use of deadly was objectively reasonable under the applicable standard, Deputy Skidmore was legally justified in acting preemptively under these circumstances and the perceived threat posed by Mr. Ramirez   justified the use of deadly force.

As described above, the law allows that Deputy Skidmore was entitled to react “in such way and with such force as, under all the circumstances, he, at the moment, honestly believed, and had reasonable grounds to believe, were necessary to save his own life, or to protect himself from great bodily injury.”  I find no evidence that Deputy Skidmore “failed to react as a reasonable and prudent man would be likely to act under similar conditions and circumstances,” and “this is all the law, reason, or justice demands.”  

The officer’s actions are judged on the facts and circumstances which existed at the time of the officer’s actions. Although Deputy Skidmore did not see Mr. Ramirez with a weapon, there was no reasonable way Deputy Skidmore could have known whether he possessed a deadly weapon or not. As stated above, I must review the facts reasonably known to the officer at the time, and not with the benefit of a methodical, deliberate investigation which later revealed that the only weapon inside the vehicle was the folding knife found near the driver’s seat.

Graham Factors

In reviewing the totality of the circumstances, several relevant considerations exist:

The incident occurred at night. Mr. Ramirez was stopped at about 3:30 in the morning. The darkness, tinting of the windows and shape of the small hatchback vehicle all served to limit the officers’ ability to see what Mr. Ramirez was doing and what may have been available to him.

The suspect’s demeanor. Perhaps the most significant consideration is the erratic behavior of Mr. Ramirez. The dash cam shows Mr. Ramirez pointing his hands with a “shooter’s grip” at both Deputy Judy and Deputy Skidmore. For the purpose of this analysis, while those actions which were not observed by the deputies are not used to justify the homicide, they nonetheless can characterize the general nature of the suspect’s demeanor. Deputy Judy states that Mr. Ramirez was shouting “DO IT” which he took to mean as taunting the deputies to shoot him. The actions observed on the dash cam support the deputies’ perception that Mr. Ramirez was acting in an erratic, irrational and potentially threatening manner.

Whether the suspect was intoxicated and noncompliant. Based on the driving pattern and late confirmed by the toxicology report, Mr. Ramirez was intoxicated. His condition created a reasonable fear that his behavior could be a threat to the deputies’ and the public safety were demonstrated by crossing over into the opposing lane of traffic, his refusal to stop, and trying to start the car after the PIT maneuver. After he was forcibly stopped, Mr. Ramirez continued to be noncompliant with the deputies’ instructions, which led Deputy Judy to determine he should deploy his K-9 partner.

Whether the suspect is, or appears to be, violent or dangerous. Mr. Ramirez continued to try and start his car even with two officers in close proximity to the front of his vehicle. His motions were reasonably perceived as potentially dangerous. This is confirmed by the dash cam footage which showed Mr. Ramirez was attempting to make the deputies believe he was armed. The act of rolling down the passenger door window instead of unlocking the door is also significant, because it could have been interpreted as Mr. Ramirez gaining a better view of the officers by lowering the tinted window. Although it cannot be used to directly justify the shooting, it cannot be disproved that Mr. Ramirez may have retrieved a folding knife and opened the blade, and that the blade fell to the floor near his feet. Although the deputies did not perceive all of these actions, it is indicative of the overall nature of his interaction.

Although there was no physical altercation with Mr. Ramirez, given the circumstances, the deputies could not simply enter the vehicle and control Mr. Ramirez by hand, which complicated their response to the situation.

The duration of the confrontation. Although the incident lasted less than two minutes after Deputy Skidmore exited his vehicle, this is actually a significant amount of time as it relates to taking an offender into custody, which is normally accomplished within a few seconds.

Whether it occurs during a chase or an arrest. Although the pursuit did not last for an excessive distance or at an excessive speed, there is no question Mr. Ramirez was refusing to stop for the lights and siren of the deputies behind him, even though he acknowledged there presence through his actions. Further, Mr. Ramirez’s actions indicated he intended to flee if he was able to start his vehicle. Mr. Ramirez’s arrest in a safe manner was obstructed by his actions and failure to comply with instructions given by the deputies.

The possibility that the suspect may be armed. In this case the deputies had no indication that the suspect was armed. However, the vehicle constituted a danger to the officers if Mr. Ramirez could have started the vehicle and made it mobile. Although this was not a direct threat at the time Deputy Skidmore fired his weapon, it added to the overall nature of the incident as dangerous to the deputies.

Final Considerations

I find there is no evidence that Deputy Skidmore was acting with any other motivation than self-defense. This is corroborated by the force science analysis by Special Agent Christopher Terry, a Force Science Analyst certified by the Force Science Institute, attached to this review. Agent Terry’s analysis indicates that Deputy Skidmore’s use of his firearm was solely in reaction to Mr. Ramirez’s threatening movements.

It is now the law in the United States, that the burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an accused defendant did not act in self-defense.  I find that the evidence does not support that conclusion.

Excessive force. In the exercise of self-defense, an individual is not allowed to use excessive force. Initial indications are that Mr. Ramirez was struck somewhere between 4 (indicated by paramedics) and eight times (indicated by EIRMC medical records). The autopsy report is not complete at the time of this review, but initial indications are that most of these wounds individually would likely have been fatal.

The question may arise why Deputy Skidmore fired the number of shots he fired (nine), and whether this would amount to “excessive force.” In fact, some who are familiar with historical law enforcement training may be aware of obsolete training which taught officers to “pause and assess” after two or three shots. However, modern law enforcement firearms training no longer teaches this pause and assess methodology, opting instead to teach to fire until the threat has ceased. Modern firearms with “reset” allow for rapid fire sequences that have become more common in police shootings. The number of shots fired in this scenario is not excessive given that Deputy Skidmore, consistent with this training, was reacting to a movement he perceived as a threat which lasted about 2 seconds. It also appears that Deputy Skidmore ceased firing as soon as he perceived there was no longer a threat. See the attached force science analysis by Special Agent Christopher Terry.

Based on this analysis, Deputy Skidmore began firing when he observed the lunge and ceased firing when he observed Mr. Ramirez return to a seated position in the driver’s seat. The logical conclusion is that Deputy Skidmore reacted solely to the lunge and ceased firing as soon as he recognized there was no further threat.

CONCLUSION

Words are inadequate to describe the tragedy of these circumstances. The lives of Mr. Ramirez’s loved ones are forever changed by the decisions he made that night. Deputy Skidmore is likewise permanently affected by the tragic outcome, regardless of my legal findings.

Perhaps the most important factor in the legal analysis of whether Deputy Skidmore acted reasonably is the lack of a reasonable, alternative explanation for Mr. Ramirez’s lunge toward the back seat. A law enforcement officer cannot reasonably, or in fact, legally be expected to predict the unpredictable or make sense of irrational behavior. Especially, in the heat of the moment with only seconds to determine whether there is a deadly threat. That is the law in Idaho.

The scope of the prosecutor’s review of officer involved shootings is limited to the evaluation of whether an officer’s action should subject him to criminal prosecution. It is not my role to evaluate the officer’s judgment or to determine whether the officer(s) acted within policy. These roles are left in this case to the Sheriff, who is an equal, elected constitutional officer. It is inappropriate for me to step into the Sheriff’s purview and engage in any kind of “would of, could of, should of” speculation. Nor do I suggest that I have reached any such conclusions, whether positive or negative, as to these other questions.

It is therefore my conclusion for the legal reasons described above and based on the state of the evidence available to me at this time, that Deputy Skidmore’s actions at the 1200 block of Woodruff Avenue in Idaho Falls on September 1, 2024, do not constitute criminal conduct. Therefore, a prosecution for his actions must be DECLINED.

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